OCHA Situation Report
Cote d'Ivoire
11-16 June 2005


Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

The purpose of the mission was two-folded: to support the protection
network OCHA intends to put in place and to look at the humanitarian
aspects of the DDRR/RC project. Issues encountered during the mission

1. Fiction versus reality: at the outset, we must flag a contradiction
between the reassurances about the potential disarmament/re-integration
process and the ensuing elections while on the ground there is hardly
any hard facts that could substantiate this discourse. Who will take the
decision to announce that the process is on halt? Though all different
parties to the conflict are not ready for the process, it is not in
their interest to announce that the process is not ripe. The basic
reason for the lack of results is still linked to the initial reason why
the crisis erupted, i.e. the code of nationality.

2. Under these circumstances, what are the ways forward, especially for
the humanitarian community. Is the UNCP taking into consideration an
immediate response based on UNCT local and pre-positioned resources (for
how long and for how many people)? Is a timeline defined in terms of
stand-by capacities, which can be activated?

3. DDRR process: Does the revamped national cell provide sufficient
transparency and accountability. The humanitarians within the UN are
expecting feedback from ONUCI on a couple of issues, still to be
addressed. What is the role of OCHA is the JOC (Joint Operational Cell)
up and running, even it may be called differently. The initial hiccups
in Liberia on DDRR were directly related to the absence of a JOC. Though
Liberia and CDI cannot be compared, the capacity of the State in CDI is
getting weaker and weaker, as it has been illustrated during the last
tragedy on Douekoue, as well as the nosedive in terms of services
provided (water, electricity, education).

4. Protection: how is a protection network functioning in CDI? How could
a flow of information coming from the field and reaching Abidjan, be
analysed and lead to actions taken on a daily or weekly basis. How could
this protection network link up with ONUCI on order to let the mission
play a deterrent effect in potential acts of violence to come. The
protection network, beside its role of information, can also be used as
a tool for advocacy, a role that OHCHR within the mission may not play.

5. Impunity: in several UN reports, the issue of impunity is one pattern
that remains untouched and catalyses the violence. Now, when Licorne
arrests suspects, suspects are handed over to MINUCI who, not knowing
what to do, hands them over to FDS or FAFN according to their origin,
forces which release the suspects immediately without putting them under
arrest. The very same suspects are funnelled back into the process, and
partly thanks to the UN, remain unpunished. A more constructive
mechanism must be put in place (transfer to Abidjan?), or the UN should
stop taking any responsibility in the process.

6. Flashpoints analysis: is it possible to identify potential areas
where violence is not unlikely to take place. It seems that some
agencies, including inside the UN system, have warned about potentials
for violence in Douekoue. Why has this warning not resulted into some
movements of troops? In a former incident in Legouale, BANBAT had
allegedly taken action (though sources differ), but not in Douekoue.
Today, the IDP camp in Gigglo is a potential target with some 7.000
civilians and warning signs have been issued. Flashpoints should not
necessarily be defined in terms of geography, but also in terms of
potential for frictions, including within the same ethnic groups as it
is well known within Guere (in support or opposing the presence of
Allogenes), or also between age classes, putting elders more at risk
because more moderate.

7. Role of the "Comite de Suivi" now that the South African Presidency
is likely to be the higher authority (or is it not?)

8. Future of DMZ, which is actually the heartland of Sam Bokhari, where
massacres have taken place in the past. The worse violence did take
place, perpetrated by the Lima forces against the "autochtones". How
does it impact on the situation now, when Abidjan plays with the idea of
reducing the DMZ?

Protection network

9) The working group on protection and displaced persons met on 15 June
and was attended by ONUCI, Humanitarian Coordination office, HCR, FAO,
WFP, UNFPA, ICRC, IOM, SCF and was chaired by OCHA. A strategic paper
was presented by OCHA and discussed. It will be imperative to
operationalize this paper, define clearly the network providing the
information which will trigger actions in Abidjan, streamline the "who
does what" to avoid the transmission of contradictory messages to the
various actors. The collection of information will be greatly
facilitated by UNOCI and reinforced by humanitarians present on the
ground. OCHA Abidjan will have to reinforce its capacity to handle and
analyze the information and will make it available to the working group.
In terms of deliverables by the working group, the following has been
recommended by the undersigned:

    To establish a trigger mechanism by which ONUCI forces could be
    required to move to an area of high protection concerns. This would
    imply the strategic choice of the mission to prioritise areas at the
    expense of others, at least until ONUCI would be expanded. OHCHR
    represents ONUCI in the working group and will bring to the attention
    of the SRSG's office.

    To collect information on trends of violations perpetrated against
    civilians in the field, whoever the perpetrators, to constitute a
    base for a high level intervention. Here the working group functions
    as an advisory board for the HC/D-SRSG or SRSG for proposed action at
    Governmental or Forces Nouvelles or others. Procedures should be
    further discussed to know whether this information would be passed on
    a monthly basis or ad-hoc. The rationale for this product is
    different from the HR report and could be transmitted directly to the
    parties on a more confidential basis, requesting actions to be taken.
    (OCHA to make sure that it does not duplicate any ongoing actions
    taken bilaterally by any other humanitarian actor).

    To use all collected information to define advocacy strategies for
    the OCHA office in Cote d'Ivoire.


The OCHA office has also developed a useful and interesting project
called "Cohesion sociale". Through its working group, the project headed
by a national officer has produced interesting data and documents, which
the Protection working group may wish to study and include in its data
collection. The advantage of the "Cohesion sociale" working group is
that it has a broad base civil society link and will provide an
important input.

The above-mentioned recommendations have been endorsed by the UNCT on 21
June.

Demobilisation process

10) At the time of the mission, the process was virtually brought to a
halt, due to the lack of confidence felt by all those concerned by the
demobilisation. The process was to be led by the national commission and
the UN was accompanying and potentially guiding the main actors. It is
clear today that the process is skewed and expectations deceived. The
role of the humanitarian community was not clearly defined but it was
clear that the process was designed to function in a well organized and
appointed state, contrary to the process initiated in Liberia where the
UN had a bigger role. In view of the present situation in Cote d'Ivoire,
it is agreed within the UN, even though not officially, that the
process, and the election cannot happen. However, it is a delicate
statement that nobody wants to take up publicly, even less so the South
African presidency, for fearing of being accused of having failed in the
whole process. This attitude however leads to an untenable situation
where nobody says the truth but everybody knows it. It is even more
worrying that this conundrum will most likely be used by the parties to
push ahead their own respective agendas at the expense of a constructive
solution for all.

11) In our discussion with the D/SRSG, we discussed some DDRR procedures
from Liberia, especially those relevant to the assessment mission led by
DPKO to which OCHA participated in January 2004. We specifically
mentioned the potential for clarity in setting up a joint operational
cell (JOC), which constituted a platform on which all main actors were
represented, including humanitarians. It was agreed that Abidjan would
ask the UNMIL office in Monrovia the relevant documents. The D/SRSG
however underlined a serious constraint, which should be further
analysed since even within the government in Abidjan, there was no
consensus on the way forward. From the donors' perspective, Sweden was
particularly worried about the lack of transparency and accountability
of the process. At last, FN never looses an opportunity to remind that
the main reason why they took up arms in the first place, the issue of
nationality, has never been solved by the South African negotiation.

12) At the present juncture, humanitarians may not be required to be in
the forefront of the process since overarching political issues should
be solved first. However, since all seem to acknowledge that the present
project is not on track, a DDRR "plan B" should at some point be
designed and discussed.

Daniel Augstburger
Abidjan-Geneva, 28 June 2005

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