Somalia - OCHA: 21-Mar-06

OCHA Situation Report Somalia 21 March 2006

Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OVERVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN ACCESS IN SOMALIA Humanitarian access in Somalia remains critical to the country's most vulnerable populations in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection (estimated at 2.1 million) - and particularly the large number who reside in south/central region who are extremely food insecure or internally displaced. Unfortunately the drought conditions currently being experienced in southern Somalia in early 2006 have created resource-based conflict - particularly over land and water - and such disputes have already been reported in some regions of south/central during Jan and Feb 2006. On the other hand, in Gedo region, experiencing dire drought conditions, clan conflict appears to have subsided and the community is encouraging access for humanitarian aid - but the situation remains extremely volatile and fluid. In recent years lack of sustained humanitarian access and restricted operating space in south/central have been major factors affecting human survival (as well aslimiting operational capacity of aid organizations) in the region. In 2005, the operating environment for humanitarian relief operations remained varied. Some areas including Somaliland and Puntland experienced political development, economic recovery and relative stability with humanitarian access in general unhindered, although frequent reports indicate that some aid workers have been targeted in Puntland. Other areas in south/central remained dangerous and unstable with attempts to provide assistance and protection to the most vulnerable groups mostly ad hoc and event driven. Responses in south/central were often delayed as the humanitarian community struggled to negotiate access with local authorities. Access was further complicated by flooding and poor road infrastructure. Since the outbreak of civil war in 1991 and the massive humanitarian operation launched in its wake, aid in Somalia has been highly politicised. Trends show there have been moves to divert, block and attempt to control, directly or indirectly, the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection in order to strengthen the power bases of faction leaders, usually along clan lines. As a result the provision of aid can be as much a source of conflict, as well as a source of relief; the outcome being that its delivery has not always been possible or has been interrupted due to the fact that the safety and security of humanitarian relief workers cannot be assured. Faction or freelance militia with an interest in a geographical area either 1)prevent aid from reaching opposing or minority clans; 2)prevent the rehabilitation of and access to natural resources such as water and land required for survival; 3)influence agencies to hire staff and provide contracts for goods and services that favour their own kin or allies. A series of serious security incidents in October/November 2005 including the murder of a Somali National working for UNDSS in Kismayo;piracy of ships carrying humanitarian relief off the south coast and a recent wave of assassinations in Mogadishu worsened access in south/central. This has implications for the delivery of aid to the most vulnerable populations identified as being in Humanitarian Emergency, Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis or displaced. . On March 1 2006, during a UNICEF/OCHA visit to Lower Juba to consult with partners on the ground and identify quick impact priority interventions to be undertaken, the mission was ambushed in Afmadow by armed militia and a UNICEF international staff detained. Direct negotiations with the TFG and local authorities were immediately commenced to seek the staff member's quick and safe release - which after intense consultations occurred 30 hours later. The mission to Lower Juba would have enabled progress in the drought response in the region. Lower Juba is one of the worse affected regions yet also one with the smallest presence of aid organisations. Between March and November 2005 more than twenty boats were hijacked off the Somali coast and the trend does not appear to be decreasing. Kenyan vessel owners are becoming very reluctant to use the southern Somali waters and are asking for armed escort to deliver World Food Programmes (WFP) commodities or UN relief. The temporary halt of sea transport is also impacting on the availability of fuel in south Somalia, directly affecting the humanitarian flights into the area. The southern Somali coastline is one of the most dangerous in the world and WFP's operations in southern Somalia have felt the consequences. The Agency has looked into alternative transport routes, including overland from Kenya and via Djibouti to reach those in desperate need of food assistance. The situation has been further complicated by reports indicating that extremist groups pose an increased threat to humanitarian workers. This has led to the need to improve security standards and is likely to impact on humanitarian operating space. Mines are still being laid in southern Somalia, and the ongoing insecurity in the region has hindered a comprehensive plan to deal with them. Since late 2005, OCHA has been leading the UN's initiative to maximize access opportunities in south/central where authorities have shown commitment to engaging (assisting with access) with humanitarian organizations. In mid-January 2006 the Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Prime Minister in which the TFG committed itself to cooperating with the UN to enhance unhindered access and to assist in the dissemination of the MOU's principles at the local level. UN agencies have also produced a statement for local authorities and communities to adhere to basic humanitarian principles and which is being disseminated. The TFG has also created a Technical Committee which among other things will look into access issues. Where it proves difficult to access vulnerable groups in south/central in 2006 the humanitarian community will also be looking to work closely with local Somali partners and empower them to carry out the implementation and monitoring of humanitarian activities. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Appropriate Donations for International Disaster/Humanitarian Needs - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Center for International web: www.cidi.org Disaster Information listserv: www.cidi.org/listsub.htm guidelines: www.cidi.org/donate.htm - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -