OCHA Situation Report
Lebanon Crisis 2006 Interim Report
12 July - 30 August 2006
19 September 2006


Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to present an account of the humanitarian 
response from the start of the conflict in Lebanon on 12 July to 30 
August - the date at which the Humanitarian Flash Appeal was revised. 
The report coincides with the launch of the Government of Lebanon's 
Early Recovery Plans which are designed to further stimulate the needed 
rebuilding efforts. Developments on the ground indicate that it is also 
a time when the humanitarian effort should wind down and, assuming the 
political situation remains stable, should wrap up completely by the end 
of October.

With the projects under the Flash Appeal due to end before or on the 24 
October, this is an interim report that reviews activities to date. A 
more comprehensive account can be made available at the end of the 
funded emergency period.

As donors fund projects undertaken by UN agencies under the Flash 
Appeal, there is a further obligation to account to donors, usually 
involving both narrative and financial reports. In addition, UN agencies 
are regularly audited both internally and externally to ensure that 
activities are undertaken according to UN rules and financial 
regulations.

2. THE LEBANON CRISIS AND THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

2.1 NATURE OF THE CRISIS

The Israeli-Lebanese conflict was completely unexpected. It came at a 
time when Lebanon was anticipating a record tourist season and an 
economy predicted to reach 5% growth. It was also brief, lasting 33 
days. And, at its end, the more than 900,000 people who fled their homes 
in fear of their lives returned, often to destroyed homes and 
communities. Since that time, some families have been displaced for a 
second time having returned home only to find their homes uninhabitable.

It is important to reflect that this emergency was not, and did not 
become, a humanitarian crisis. It began as - and remained - a crisis of 
protection. People did not die from poor sanitation, hunger or disease. 
They died from bombs and shells.

The aversion of a humanitarian crisis during the conflict was due to a 
number of factors - the response of local Lebanese communities and 
organisations during the war who took in nearly one-quarter of the 
Lebanese population that had been displaced. Those displaced were mainly 
from the south, but also from the southern suburbs of Beirut and from 
the Bekaa Valley. It was also due to the fact that the conflict was 
short and those displaced still had coping mechanisms. And finally, it 
was due to the mobilisation of the humanitarian community.

The need for an international response on the scale that was provided - 
in what is a middle income country - was due to Israel's unleashing of a 
widespread and often indiscriminate bombardment. The month-long conflict 
between Israel and Hezbollah resulted in the death of 1,189 Lebanese and 
the injury of a further 4,399. It is estimated that approximately 30,000 
housing units were destroyed or badly damaged, the vast majority in the 
south of Lebanon and in southern Beirut.

Israel imposed a 57-day blockade (13 July - 8 September) on Lebanon, 
bombed Beirut airport, denied commercial ships and airplanes access to 
Lebanese airports and ports, and destroyed main arterial roads. Lebanon 
was paralysed as a result - trade collapsed and the economy stalled. The 
movement of people and goods between regions in Lebanon slowed to a 
trickle due to the fear of Israeli attack.

2.2 THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE DURING THE WAR

The international humanitarian response during the war focused on 
reaching those people most affected by hostilities. Within the first ten 
days of the conflict, the UN escorted civilians fleeing the fighting and 
provided urgent medical evacuations. Portable water and other essential 
relief items were distributed to IDP populations. Food and non-food 
items including essential drugs, mattresses, tents and blankets were 
transported to Lebanon and ready for distribution to conflict-affected 
areas.

The UN's added value during the course of the conflict was concentrated 
in three areas:

1. It negotiated with the Israeli military a prior notification process 
so that UN convoys, organised through the World Food Programme, could 
move without being targeted. This procedure was also employed to obtain 
clearance for UN ships and ships contracted by the Government of Lebanon 
as well as GoL convoys within Lebanon. Thus, when movement in the south 
was almost impossible due to the IDF's bombing campaign, the UN was 
still able to negotiate access for humanitarian convoys to south 
Lebanon.

Of all the planned convoys, 20% did not go ahead due to problems of 
coordination with the IDF - no reply, late reply to notification or 
advisories not to travel to specific locations. In addition, WFP convoys 
were delayed or cancelled due to the bombing of roads and bridges, the 
inability of convoy drivers to get to work, and Israeli bombings 
perilously close to UN convoys.

2. It mobilised significant logistic capacity to move relief goods. 
Through the contracting of over 80 trucks and two cargo ships, it was 
able to move large quantities of material not only for UN agencies, but 
also for NGOs and government ministries. More than 294 trucks of food 
and non-food items were mobilised to hardest hit areas during the 
conflict. Support was also provided to displaced families who had sought 
refuge in schools, mosques and other centres, through a myriad of local 
organisations and GOL structures that were also assisting.

As the graph above shows, the number of trucks deployed in convoys 
increased steadily during the war, peaked immediately following the 
cessation of hostilities and then began dropping off as the private 
sector began to be used more frequently.

The overwhelming majority of supplies were delivered directly to 
beneficiaries or through the most efficient local mechanism. 
Municipalities were most commonly used, but religious leaders and 
village elders were also engaged where local government structures were 
not functioning. Other supplies, such as medical supplies, were 
contributed to the Ministry of Health but often delivered directly to 
hospitals and clinics because of movement restrictions.

3. While the international response was humanitarian in nature, it 
played an important protection function. It maintained international 
awareness on the need to access beleaguered populations, ensured that 
access was granted to those with a humanitarian mandate, and ensured 
that there were international witnesses to the conflict - in addition to 
the large press corps. The UN advocated for the protection of civilians 
most notably through the visit of the UN Secretary General and the UN 
Emergency Relief Coordinator. On the 11th of August, the UN Human Rights 
Council decided to:

"...urgently establish and immediately dispatch a high level commission 
of inquiry, comprising of eminent experts on Human Rights Law and 
International Humanitarian Law, ... to investigate the systematic 
targeting and killing of civilians by Israel in Lebanon" (Special 
Session Resolution S-2/1).

1. Introduction

2. The Lebanon crisis and the humanitarian response

2.1 Nature of the crisis

2.2 The international response during the war

2.3 The response after the cessation of Hostilities

2.4 Organisation of the humanitarian response

2.5 Early recovery

2.6 Obstacles to recovery

3. Humanitarian assistance in numbers (12 July - 30 August)

3.1 Food

3.2 Shelter and non food items

3.3 Health

3.4 Water and sanitation

3.5 UXOs

4. Funding Status

4.1 Summary of expenditure against requirements - by cluster

4.2 Summary of expenditure against requirements - by appealing 
organisation

5. Report on cluster activities and results

5.1 Food security

5.2 Shelter and non food items (Nfi)

5.3 Health and nutrition

5.4 Water and sanitation

5.5 Protection

5.6 Education

5.7 Logistics

5.8 Emergency telecommunications

5.9 Common services

Annex A WFP food distribution by location

Annex B Tonnage delivered by the logistics cluster

Annex C Acronyms and abbreviations

Map 1a/B Food distribution

Map 2 Non food items distribution

Map 3 Water and sanitation activities

Map 4 Cluster strike Locations


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