OCHA Situation Report
Somalia:
Monthly Analysis for December 2006 - January 2007
14 February 2007


Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

This report was written in cooperation with the UN Agencies in Somalia

HIGHLIGHTS

Due to a combination of flooding and conflict, the humanitarian 
situation in south/central Somalia suffered an immediate deterioration 
in the last three months. At the same time, access to populations in 
need became increasingly difficult due to logistical and security 
constraints. At the peak of the fighting between the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), backed by Ethiopian forces, and the Islamic 
Courts Union (ICU), the TFG's closure of Somalia's border on 24 December 
effectively brought the flood response, and other life-saving 
activities, to a halt. An exemption for humanitarian flights was made on 
29 December, but access was once again obstructed in early January 2007 
by the Government of Kenya's decision to close its border.

Access, particularly to the Jubas, thus remained limited throughout 
January 2007, compounded by ongoing military air operations by the 
TFG/Ethiopian forces (and two US air strikes). Insecurity caused by 
militia and inter-clan conflict, and harassment and arbitrary detention 
of aid workers by Ethiopian forces have also deterred the resumption of 
activities. On 7 February provincial and district officials at the 
border received instructions from the Kenyan central government to allow 
humanitarian cross-border movement. Immediately trucks started to load, 
and on 9 February some supplies started to cross. It is hoped that the 
directive will break the impasse over the Kenyan border issue. 
Meanwhile, Galkayo (Mudug region), which for the past eleven months has 
been closed to UN international staff due to insecurity is now open. In 
Mogadishu, several humanitarian missions took place in January and 
logistical preparations are underway to support scaled-up engagement and 
presence by the UN.

According to the findings of the FAO/FSAU-lead 2006/7 post-Deyr survey, 
around 1 million Somalis are now in need of assistance and protection in 
the next six months (including 400,000 IDPs), as compared to the 1.8 
million identified in August 2006. The situation has improved in all 
regions except riverine areas of the Juba and the Shabelle rivers 
(riverine areas of Lower and Middle Juba, Gedo and Hiran) which are in a 
state of Humanitarian Emergency. Agro-pastoral and pastoral areas of 
Hiran, Bay and Bakool (except for some pockets) are now out of Acute 
Food and Livelihood Crisis, as is the north of Somalia.

Despite the overall improvement, Somalia remains chronically food 
insecure, with Gedo and most of the Juba regions, as well and IDPs 
extremely vulnerable. The nutrition situation also remains of concern. 
The post-drought nutrition crisis persists and the impact of the recent 
floods is just emerging, with increased admissions in feeding programmes 
in riverine areas. Critical levels of malnutrition persist in Gedo, 
Middle and Lower Juba, and parts of Bay, Bakool, and Hiran regions.

The current humanitarian situation calls for robust re-engagement to 
reach populations in need, despite the formidable security challenges. 
It is generally recognized that it is now essential to provide an 
enabling environment for the delivery of basic social services through 
the establishment of some degree of governance, law and order. This 
opportunity, however, will be short-lived. The defeat of the ICU has 
created a power vacuum in South/Central Somalia, which could lead to 
renewed chaos and return to intra- inter-clan conflict. The re-emergence 
of warlords also raises serious concerns about the need to ensure 
principled humanitarian action and a "do no harm" approach. The 
humanitarian community in Somalia is now developing a set of 'Joint 
Operating Principles' that aim to promote behaviours in line with basic 
humanitarian principles to avoid fuelling the re-establishment of the 
system of coercion and violence perpetrated in the past by 
'gatekeepers'.

Recognizing the need for a timely and prioritized approach to 
humanitarian and early recovery needs, the UN, in consultation with its 
partners has also developed a plan to support stabilization in Somalia, 
including provision of basic social services, assistance to the IDPs and 
livelihood recovery activities. This plan is based on and complementary 
to the activities and priorities envisaged in the Somalia CAP 2007, 
given that the strategic objectives of the CAP remain relevant. In view 
of the recent developments, the 2007 Somalia CAP is now being revised. 
The overall strategic objectives and the geographical focus of the CAP 
will not change. However, in view of the marked improvements in overall 
food security, it is anticipated that a few specific sectors will 
undergo a review of response plans and activities. The revision of the 
CAP will also reflect the new access opportunities that have emerged in 
the country, particularly in Galkayo and Mogadishu.

ACCESS and SECURITY

The access situation in South/Central Somalia deteriorated in December 
and January, due to a variety of factors related to flooding and 
conflict. Flooding that began in earnest in September 2006 continued 
through to December. Many primary roads remained impassable and numerous 
villages, especially in the Jubas, were completely cut off. During the 
third week of December, just as the rains tapered off, heavy fighting 
erupted between forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) ? 
supported by Ethiopian forces - and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). With 
a drastically changed operational environment, humanitarian actors are 
assessing the unfolding situation with regard to humanitarian 
reengagement on an increased level.

In November, due to access and logistical challenges posed by the rains, 
the UN had launched a special flood-response operation involving 
helicopters and boats to deliver relief supplies to affected areas. As 
flooding conditions gradually worsened along the lower reaches of the 
Juba river, the two WFP helicopters initially stationed in Wajid 
(Bakool) were on 12 December moved to Kismayo to enhance the response in 
the Jubas where presence of humanitarian agencies was very limited. 
Dropping river levels of the Shabelle, meanwhile, slowly resulted in 
improved road conditions which facilitated road transportation of relief 
supplies to riverine areas. Along the Juba, the air logistical support 
provided by the helicopters proved highly valuable. On 24 and 25 
December, WFP carried out airdrops into Lower Juba, dropping a total of 
28 metric tonnes (MT) of food.

Just as the situation began to stabilize - with flood waters receding 
and flood emergency response moving into the Jubas - widespread conflict 
broke out in critical locations throughout southern Somalia. 
Intermittent and localized fighting between the two parties had been 
building up in different locations since early December at a time when 
the UN Security Council voted to modify the arms embargo and authorize 
the establishment of a stabilization mission to Somalia. Fighting 
gradually escalated and spread from around Baidoa (Bay) to central 
Galkayo, Hiran and Middle Shabelle, with ICU forces retreating from 
their previously controlled areas.

On 24 December, a four-front counter-offensive was launched by the TFG, 
with openly declared support from the Ethiopians, against the ICU, 
including air strikes over the urban centers of Beletweyne and 
Mogadishu. The impact on humanitarian activities was direct. For 
security reasons, the TFG on 24 December announced that Somalia's 
borders were closed (mainly with regard to port and air access) directly 
affecting humanitarian flights into Somalia. The UN and most 
international NGOs relocated their international staff to Nairobi, and 
helicopters for the flood-relief operation were moved to Kenya on 26 
December. While national staff continued activities where they could, 
the momentum behind the flood response and other life-saving activities 
virtually ground to a halt. Following negotiations with the TFG and 
Kenya, an exemption was made for humanitarian flights on 29 December, 
and flights resumed, albeit on a very limited basis.

In January, however, access to the Jubas and Gedo was again curtailed by 
the Government of Kenya's decision on 2 January to seal its border (also 
on account of security concerns), preventing cross-border movement of 
humanitarian relief. Continued military air operations by the 
TFG/Ethiopian forces (and two US air strikes) also negatively impacted 
on access and activities, as did the presence of militia, inter-clan 
conflict and the lack of local authority interlocutors/counterparts (to 
fill the power vacuum left by the ICU). Further, harassment and 
arbitrary detention of aid workers by Ethiopian forces deterred some 
organizations from resuming presence. The use of Kismayo airport in 
Lower Juba by Ethiopian military left the airstrip off-limits to UN 
flights, preventing, among other things, a much-needed medical mission 
to Kismayo to monitor the presence of Rift Valley Fever, confirmed in 
neighbouring Kenya.

Following various demarches undertaken by the Humanitarian Coordinators 
of the Kenya and Somalia operations, a directive allowing cross border 
movement was issued by the Kenyan government on 7 February. Until then, 
relief supplies had remained stuck at the border. As of 5 February, over 
9,000mt of food aid were waiting at El Wak and Mandera border points in 
Kenya, while 40 WFP trucks had been unable to re-enter Somalia for 
reloading of relief at El Wak. Aircraft fuel for humanitarian flights 
within Somalia and non-food relief supplies were also unable to cross. 
Agencies, where possible, employed alternative means to move cargo, with 
emergency fuel being flown in from Kenya at high cost, and food and 
non-food items being shipped from Mombasa port. The border closure also 
prevented Somalis seeking asylum from crossing into Kenya (see 
protection section). Following the issuance of the directive, on 9 
February, two trucks carrying jetfuel crossed at Mandera destined for 
Wajid. On 13 February, 40 trucks loaded with WFP food crossed at the El 
Wak border point. It is hoped the directive will break the impasse over 
the Kenyan border issue.

Humanitarian passenger flights have now resumed to most of 
South/Central, with the exception of airstrips in Lower Juba and Merka 
(Lower Shabelle) and Johwar (Middle Shabelle). The opening of Galkayo 
(Mudug) represents a breakthrough in access and has facilitated the 
implementation of a multi-agency response now underway; for the past 
eleven months Galkayo had been closed to UN international staff due to 
insecurity. Various missions have also taken place to Mogadishu 
(although cleared on a case by case basis) where the UN is now making 
the necessary logistical preparations to support enhanced presence and 
engagement. Efforts are underway to ensure better access to Beletweyne, 
Jowhar, Kismayo and Merka.

Since early January, reports are increasingly coming in of a worsening 
security situation in the capital, with a rise in gun and mortar attacks 
(including on high-profile installations), rapes and checkpoints. In 
early February, the situation continued to escalate. A mortar attack on 
5 February targeted the capital's seaport, and vessels reportedly moved 
further out to sea for safety. Ship owners have indicated that they 
would be hesitant to return to Mogadishu port without a guarantee of 
safe berthing from the TFG. In other locations of southern Somalia, 
reports are coming in of an increasing return to inter-clan fighting. 
The return of warlords also raises serious concerns. That said, the 
precarious humanitarian situation calls for urgent re-engagement and 
assistance to populations in need. If any degree of stabilization is to 
be achieved, the necessary support must be provided to bring about some 
degree of law and order and delivery of basic social services.

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