Liberia - DHA: 20.Dec.96
Liberia - DHA: 20.Dec.96
United Nations
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILISATION PROGRESS IN LIBERIA
20 December 1996
INTRODUCTION
1. HACO and the humanitarian community have consistently
made it known that the revised implementation schedule
under the Abuja agreement did not take into account the
necessary time for resource mobilization and positioning,
requiredtoconductdisarmament and demobilisation.
However, it was determined that the international community
and the UN specifically was obliged to be in a position to
begin limited demobilisation by 22 November 1996. HACO has
mobilized the humanitarian community and committed all of
its own human resources to the operation.
DEMOBILISATION PLANNING
2. In early September, at the initiative of HACO, the
Demobilisation and Reintegration Task Force (DRTF) was
reactivated. This Task Force, under HACO chairmanship,
included donors (EU and US), UNOMIL, ECOMOG, Liberian
Government Agencies, UN Agencies and International and
National NGOs. The DRTF adopted a Demobilisation Plan in
early November which was subsequently submitted to the
Council of State. The plan is a consensus document agreed
upon by all parties. According to the Demobilisation Plan,
the following requirements were to be met before the
commencementofthedisarmamentand demobilisation
exercise.
a)Presentation of a disarmament plan by UNOMIL and
ECOMOG,
b)Identification and verification of demobilisation
sites by UNOMIL, NDDC, and ECOMOG,
c)Guaranteed security for demobilisation staff and
demobilising fighters,
d)Positioning of human and material resources for
demobilisation, bridging and reintegration, and,
e)TheproposedUN-HACObudgetforgeneral
demobilisation and bridging programmes approved.
3. The disarmament and demobilisation operation began on 22
November1996,asenvisaged in the extended Abuja
Agreement, although none of the above is yet to be
satisfactory met.
4. In late September, HACO prepared and submitted a General
Demobilisation Budget which included funding for Bridging
programmes. That funding has yet to be received, meant that
HACO has had to implement the Demobilisation Programme with
only three Demobilisation Officers on the ground, no
resources required to sustain field operations, nor the
funding for bridging programmes that would lend some
credibility to the undertaking. In order to accomplish the
demobilisation task, HACO has had to deploy all six of the
HACO officers, both demobilisation and humanitarian, to the
field.
POLITICAL-MILITARY CONSTRAINTS
5. Key policy considerations affecting demobilisation have
yet to be addressed. If assiduously adhered to, the
scheduleof implementation calls for disarmament and
demobilisation to end on 31 January 1997. During the first
twenty-four days of the disarmament and demobilisation
operation, five thousand fighters have been processed. If
the process continues at this pace, it will take an
additional eight months to disarm and demobilise the
estimated sixty-thousand fighters. Given the slow pace of
disarmamentand demobilisation, does the schedule of
implementationremainrealistic?If disarmament and
demobilisation is officially halted on 31 January 1997,
then what of those arms and fighters that remain in
circulation? In the event that the above occurs, how does
one satisfy the requirement that security of the country
has been established, sufficient to convince the Liberian
people,NGOs and other humanitarian organisations to
commenceoperationsin those areas? Therefore, HACO
strongly recommends the initiation of urgent discussion of
these issues.
6. The objective of the disarmament and demobilisation
operation, within the peace process, is to dismantle the
fighting capacity of the factions, sever the chain of
command and dissolve the factions themselves. In this way,
it is hoped to create secure conditions that guarantee the
freedom of movement in the country, conducive to the start
of repatriation, resettlement and reintegration programmes.
However, success in disarmament and demobilisation seems to
be focusing on the quantities of arms and ammunition
collected and the head count of those fighters demobilised.
With continued reports of harassment and abuse of civilians
by armed fighters, and the existence of armed check-points,
despite the Abuja agreement, HACO suggests that progress
toward the cessation of these activities is a better
measure of success of the programme. The appreciation of
this aspect of the peace process would go a long way
towards furthering the credibility and efficacy of the
goals of the programme, within the context of the peace
process.
7. A major component of the demobilisation process, the
movement of demobilised combatants to their destinations of
choice, has yet to be implemented. Ostensibly the reason is
a lack of transportation resources. The result of this is
thatthe demobilised combatants are returned to the
immediate community to rejoin their former commanders. In
some sites, demobilised combatants have been arrested by
their former commanders, stripped, thrown in jail, and have
had their demobilisation documents seized and destroyed. In
other areas, demobilised combatants have been abducted and
sent back to the fighting or have had death threats made
for having disarmed and demobilised against the will of the
faction. These practices have placed in question the
efficacy of the disarmament and demobilisation process and
the goals it hopes to achieve.
8. The deployment of ECOMOG and the Cease-fire Violations
Committee are essential to the process of assuring faction
leaders of their security and encouraging them to disarm
and demobilise their fighters. However, faction leaders are
approaching HACO staff on the ground, citing recent attacks
by rival factions as an excuse for their reluctance to
disarmanddemobilisetheirfighters. That ECOMOG
representatives on the ground are unable to investigate the
validity of these claims, combined with the failure of the
Cease-fireViolationsCommitteetoreporton the
outstandingcease-fireviolationinvestigations, has
revealed this process to be moribund. It is imperative that
we move quickly to remove whatever excuse the factions may
present, so as to push disarmament and demobilisation
process forward.
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION
9. All partners in the disarmament and demobilisation
programmeagreedthatpublic information and media
activities were essential to the success of the programme.
To this end, a specific line item was included in the
budget prepared on 5 October 1996, for the cost of media
activities.Additional projects focusing on community
sensitization and civic education were included in the
forthcoming Consolidated Appeal. However, because of a lack
of funding, no activities have been conducted to date. In
this regard, HACO has not been able to counter the faction
leaderships disinformation campaign.
10. According to the Demobilisation Plan, the government
andthefactions are responsible for informing and
sensitizingthecombatantsonthe disarmament and
demobilisation process. To date, this has not been done,
and in fact there has been a consistent effort, at various
levels,to misinform the combatants, raising serious
questions of unfulfilled expectations. Furthermore, the
commentsmade by ECOMOG at various times, regarding
incentivesandthequantity of food, have created
confrontational and dangerous situations on the ground for
HACO, WFP and NGO staff. That no political effort has been
made to present a unified front on these issues themselves,
from all sides, on a policy which had been previously
approved by all relevant parties, including ECOMOG.
11. To push the Liberian population into vocal support of
the objectives of the demobilisation programme and to
address these issues, HACO urgently requires
international and national public information-media
relations staff and programme funding to support the
requisite level of public information production.
DEMOBILISATION SITE OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT
12. Regarding field support, UNOMIL never completed the
required site evaluations for reasons well understood and
appreciated by HACO. Completing such would have allowed
them to better support deploying personnel with the
necessary resources. Deployed personnel found structures
to be inadequate or filthy, and with no provision for
basic elements of survival, i.e. water, sanitation,
accommodation, food, communication and security. At
deployed sites, demobilisation personnel at times sleep
up to eleven persons in rooms without windows or doors.
Security for supplies is provided only by the staff
members physical presence in a room. Water continues to
be a problem with few containers for collecting and
storing water for drinking and cleaning. Camp Naama,
Voinjama and Zwedru sites have the additional problem of
food scarcity. Out of necessity and over the objections
of WFP, site personnel resorted to eating the food
intended for demobilising combatants.
13. Sites remain short of tables and chairs. Lack of
materials to provide privacy have limited the medical
screening process to an interview versus the required
physical examination. Recognizing the importance of the
credibility of the operation, HACO approached the U.S.
Embassy to identify the need for ID card-producing
equipment. The U.S. Government agreed to provide two sets
of equipment immediately and an additional four have just
been delivered. Inability to issue ID cards has
precipitated near riots in some sites.
BRIDGING PROGRAMMES
14. The lack of programmes to occupy ex-fighters is
threatening a growing disillusionment with the
disarmament and demobilisation process on the part of the
fighters. Initial optimism of the fighters to begin a new
life has been turning towards a new feeling of being
misled by the international community. The Bridging
programmes were intended to provide the immediate
gratification to the ex-fighters and to their
communities, thereby building community support for the
exercise and assuring the individual fighter of some
level of support after disarmament and demobilisation. It
is recognized that the reintegration of demobilised
fighters and confidence building among the receiving
communities and the ex-combatants will have a direct
impact on the long term stability of Liberia. Recognizing
that WFP, EU and UNOPS have initiated some labor
intensive activities, it must be underscored that the
timely and wide-scale commencement of bridging and
reintegration activities is an important component of any
such confidence building measures.
COORDINATION AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
15. It is envisioned that bridging and reintegration
activities will be funded through a combination of
multilateral and bilateral projects. To provide relevant
and timely information and coordination among funding
agencies, it was decided to establish an Executive
Committee comprising the key funding agencies: HACO,
UNOPS, EU, CRS and WFP. The Committee will provide a
forum for exchange of information, experience, and will
ensure that policies and guidelines are followed, and
resources are used optimally, while funding agencies will
retain their rights of final selection and evaluation of
all projects. It was agreed that the Executive Committee
will be guided by the programme policies developed by an
Advisory Board.
16. The reintegration programme will be guided by an -
Advisory Board-, comprising USAID, EU, WFP, CRS, UNICEF
and NGOs. The Advisory Board has been set up with the
view to ensuring broader participation. While UN-HACO
will continue to coordinate the bridging programme, it
will also chair the Advisory Board. The Board will
formulate policy guidelines for project preparation and
implementation, and will monitor implementation and
compliance with the agreed guidelines. It is further
agreed that:
a)For the purpose of uniformity, a standard project
format will be prepared, adapted from existing UN-NGO
project proforma,
b)Funding agencies will advise UN-HACO on projects
approved for funding and UN-HACO will maintain a database
on the programmes and projects carried out under the
bridging-reintegration programme, and disseminate to all
concerned,
c)Although a project could be financed by more than
one donor, duplication or double financing will be
strictly monitored and avoided.
GUIDING PRINCIPLE
17. Sectoral committees have been requested to develop
guiding principles for bridging and initial reintegration
activities. This is being done to provide complementarity
to ongoing assistance programmes and avoid duplication of
effort. The following sectors will be addressed: Civil
reconstruction teams-public works programmes, vocational
training programmes, special programmes for ex-child
fighters and war-affected youth, agricultural sector
assistance for those opting to go into farming and
education.
Mr. Tesema Negash
UN Humanitarian Coordinator - Monrovia
Tel.: (231) 226 041-042
Fax: (874) 175 46 27 (sat.)
Complex Emergencies Division (CED) New York
Mr. Peter Due
Tel.: (1 212) 963.1731
Fax: (1 212) 963.3630
E-Mail: due@un.org
Inter-Agency Support Branch (IASB) Geneva
Ms. Deborah Saidy-Mr. Chris Kaye
Tel.: (41 22) 788.6384-788.6385
Fax: (41 22) 788.6386
E-Mail: Deborah.Saidy@dha.unicc.org
Press to contact (DHA-Geneva)
Ms. Madeleine Moulin-Acevedo
Tel.: (41 22) 917.2856
Fax: (41 22) 917.0023
Telex: 414242 DHA CH
E-Mail: dhagva@dha.unicc.org